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1 Introduction
This paper presents the impact of transport costs on the spatial patterns of economic ag-
glomeration. In particular, we focus on the recent advances in the so-called new economic
geography (see Fujita et. al [12] a comprehensive survey) which explains the population
and industry localization by endogenously generating agglomeration economies through
interactions among increasing returns, transport costs, and factor mobility.
Although it has long been pointed out that agglomeration economies play an important
role in explaining the localization patterns of population and industries (e.g., Marshall
[35], Isard [24], Meyer [36], Cronon [3]), the formalization of the theory has not much
proceeded in this direction until the recent outbreak of the new economic geography
triggered by Krugman [27].1 The modeling approach of the new economic geography is
very specific in that the agglomeration force is generated by the use of the Dixit-Stiglitz
[4] type monopolistic competition model in which the agglomeration force is derived from
the monopolistically competitive behavior of many small firms which produce varieties of
differentiated goods, and that the transportation of goods is subject to Samuelson’s [44]
iceberg technology (i.e., transport costs are incurred in the goods shipped).2 Nonetheless,
this approach has unraveled, in a general equilibrium context, the mechanism of several
important phenomena of the economy’s spatial organization such as the emergence of
a core-periphery structure corresponding to the north-south dualism and the formation,
spatial distribution and industrial composition of cities.3
In such models with endogenous agglomeration economies, the delicate balance be-
tween the agglomeration and dispersion forces determines the spatial structure of the
economy. In particular, recent studies (e.g., Krugman [27][29], Helpman [19], Mori [38];
Tabuchi [46]) have revealed that the balance between these two opposing forces is crit-
ically influenced by transport costs, and that the impacts of transport cost changes on
the spatial structure of the economy drastically differ depending on the nature of ag-
glomeration and dispersion forces involved. Especially, it turned out that the interaction
of the same agglomeration force with different types of dispersion forces may lead to
quite different spatial organizations of the economy. In these studies, however, while the
mechanism of the spatial agglomeration has been well investigated, no systematic analysis
has been conducted to explain the mechanism of spatial dispersions. Consequently, the
role of transport costs in determining the economic geography has been unveiled only
fragmentarily.
1On one hand, one stream of the traditional urban economic theory (e.g., Mills [37], Papageorgiou and
Thisse [42], Fujita [7]) has been successful in explaining the formation of a central business district within
a metropolitan area in a partial equilibrium context. However, it has little to say about the relative
location, size and specialization pattern of each metropolis within an economy. On the other hand, while
the other stream which particularly called the urban systems theory led by Henderson [21][22][23] has
been able to generate different specialization patterns and sizes among cities in a general equilibrium
context, this approach lacks the spatial dimension. For a detailed review of these theories, see Fujita [8]
and Fujita and Thisse [16].
2See Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse [41] for an alternative formulation of monopolistic competition
using quasi-linear utility function with non-icerberg transport costs.
3For the emergence of a core-periphery structure, see Krugman [27][28]. For the formation of a city,
see Krugman [29] and Fujita and Krugman [10]. For the spatial distribution and industrial composition
of cities, see Fujita and Mori [14] and Fujita et. al. [11], respectively.
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In the present paper, we hi-light the nature of dispersion forces incorporated in the new
economic geography models. The agglomeration force considered here is the standard one
in the new economic geography, i.e., that based on the monopolistic competition model
with a variety in consumption goods. The mechanism of agglomeration economies can
be described as follows. The production of each variety of differentiated goods (D-goods)
is subject to an increasing returns technology using labor as a sole input. Due to scale
economies at the plant level, then each variety of D-goods is produced at a single site,
while because of transport costs, suppliers prefer to locate closer to markets. On the
other hand, the presence of transport costs makes consumers (who are workers at the
same time) concentrate at a location where a wider variety of products is available, i.e.,
the location at which firms producing differentiated goods (D-firms) agglomerate. The
concentration of workers thus generates a large demand for D-goods as well as a large
labor pool for D-firms, which further attracts more D-firms to the location.
The dispersion force can be generated by incorporating immobile resources in some
forms. The models of new economic geography, in particular, introduce homogeneous
consumption goods (H-goods) which embody immobile resources. In this context, two
types of dispersion forces, i.e., the local demand pull and factor price pull, may be derived.
First, the local demand pull arises when some consumers are inevitably dispersed over
space. For instance, H-goods are represented by agricultural goods in Krugman [27] and
Fujita and Krugman [10]. In the former, the agricultural goods are produced by a fraction
of the total population who is spatially dispersed and immobile, while in the later, they are
produced by using labor and land as inputs, where the land is immobile and distributed
over space, while labor is supplied by freely mobile workers. In either case, the demand for
D-goods generated by workers employed in the agricultural sector is inevitably dispersed
over space, and hence a D-firm may find it profitable to move away from competitors and
locate in the agricultural area serving primarily this local market where the intensity of
competition is lower.
The factor price pull may become a dispersion force when H-goods themselves or
whose production inputs are spatially dispersed and immobile, and the transportation of
H-goods is costly. An example of the former is the land for housing in Helpman [19], and
that for the latter is the agricultural good in the Fujita-Krugman model which is produced
using land as an input. In either case, the concentration of D-firms and workers at one
location raises the price for these land-intensive goods there, which in turn increases the
wage rate there. Thus, a D-firm may be attracted to deviate from the concentration
of other D-firms in order to enjoy the labor cost advantage near the production site of
land-intensive H-goods.
In this paper, we investigate how the balance between the agglomeration force and
these two types of dispersion forces changes and affect the spatial structure of the econ-
omy when transport costs gradually decrease. Since the existing studies have already
accumulated enough results for the impact of changes in transport cost for D-goods, we
first summarize and interpret their findings. We then proceed to investigate the case
in which transport costs for both D- and H-goods change by using the Fujita-Krugman
framework, in which both types of dispersion forces are incorporated. In particular, we
adopt a continuous location space in order to analyze the spatial structure/distribution
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of agglomeration in a pure form. In the Fujita-Krugman framework, a city is defined as
the location of D-firms.
It will be demonstrated that if the transport cost for D-goods decreases relatively faster
than that for H-goods, then while D-firms may first agglomerate into a smaller number
of (discrete) cities, they eventually disperse over an interval leading to the formation
of a megalopolis which consists of large discrete cities (or, core cities) connected by an
industrial belt (a continuum of cities). Moreover the megalopolis expands given a further
relative decrease in the transport cost for D-goods. On the other hand, if the transport cost
for H-goods decreases relatively faster, then D-firms agglomerate into a smaller number
of cities.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarizes the basic structure of the
models of a spatial economy based on the monopolistic competition model with a variety
in consumption goods. In section 3, the nature of agglomeration and dispersion forces are
presented. In particular, the sources and effects of the two types of dispersion forces are
compared. Section 4 introduces the adjustment mechanism which governs the stability
and reorganization of the spatial structure of the economy when transport costs change.
Section 5, discusses the impact of the decrease in transport costs for D-goods based on
the works by Krugman [27][29], Helpman [19], Mori [38] and Tabuchi [46]. In section 6,
by using the Fujita-Krugman framework, new findings are presented regarding the impact
of simultaneous changes in transport costs for both D- and H-goods on the organization
of the economic geography. Concluding remarks for future research directions end the
paper.
2 The basic model
In this section, we introduce the common structure of models of a spatial economy which
incorporate the Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition model with varieties of con-
sumption goods.
Consider an economy which produces two types of consumption goods. One is an
H-good produced under a constant-returns technology and perfect competition, while the
other are varieties of D-goods, each of which is produced under an increasing-returns
technology and monopolistic competition.
Every consumer in the economy shares the same tastes, and her welfare is represented
by a Cobb-Douglas function of consumption of H-goods, ZH , and a composite of D-goods,
ZD:
U = ZµDZ
1−µ
H , (2-1)
where µ ∈ (0, 1). When a continuum of varieties of size n is supplied, the composite of
D-goods takes the following CES function of consumption of each differentiated variety:
ZD =
©R n
0
z(ω)(σ−1)/σdω
ªσ/(σ−1)
, (2-2)
where σ (>1) is the elasticity of substitution, i.e., a smaller value of σ implies that
consumers have a stronger preference for variety. Since the number of firms producing
D-goods is assumed to be large, the impact of a price change by any individual firm on the
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total demand for each D-good is negligible, and hence the price elasticity of an individual
demand for each variety is also given by a constant, σ.
The production of each D-good uses labor as a sole input in such a way that the total
amount of labor, L (ω), required to produce any individual variety ω of quantity z(ω) is
given by the sum of fixed labor input, α, and variable labor input, βz(ω):
L(ω) = α+ βz (ω) , (2-3)
where α and β are given positive constants.
Next, given a location space, X, it is assumed that there are costs of transporting
goods. In particular, transport costs take Samuelson’s iceberg form, in which only a
fraction of a good shipped arrives. For instance, if a unit of a good is shipped over a
distance d, only e−τd units reach the destination, where τ is a positive constant. It follows
that the transport cost is multiplicative to the mill price of a good: if the mill price of a
good is p, then its delivered price at a distance d from the location of the firm is peτd.
Due to this multiplicative nature of the transport cost, the price elasticity of an in-
dividual demand is independent of location, which in turn implies that the elasticity of
aggregate demand is also independent of the spatial distribution of consumers, and equals
the price elasticity of an individual demand, σ. It follows that the profit-maximizing mill
price, pD(x), of each D-good produced at location x ∈ X is given by
pD(x) =
β
1− 1/σW (x), (2-4)
where W (x) is the wage rate prevailing at x.
Finally, the free entry of D-firms assures their zero profit in equilibrium, which results
in an equilibrium output level, q, of each firm given by a constant:
q = (σ − 1)α/β. (2-5)
It follows that the equilibrium labor input of each D-firm is also a constant given by
L = ασ. (2-6)
3 Agglomeration force and dispersion force
In the presence of transport costs, consumers and suppliers of D-goods attract each other
due to consumers’ love of variety in D-goods and increasing returns in the D-good pro-
duction. Working against this agglomeration force, a dispersion force may arise from the
desire of firms to move away from competitors, or that to move to a remote location
which offers a lower labor cost. In the two subsections below, we explain in detail the
mechanisms that generate these agglomeration and dispersion forces.
3.1 Agglomeration force
In the context of the model introduced in the previous section, there exist two sources of
agglomeration force. One is the consumers’ love of variety in D-goods. Namely, the utility
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level of each consumer increases with the size n of varieties. To see this, suppose each
variety is sold at the same price p, and let Y denote the fraction of a consumer’s income
spent on D-goods. Then, the consumption of each variety is given by z (ω) = Y/(np) for
each ω ∈ [0, n]. It follows that by (2-2) the utility from the consumption of D-goods can
be measured by Y n1/(σ−1)/p, which increases with n. In particular, this increase is larger
if goods are more differentiated, i.e., σ is smaller.
The other sources of agglomeration force is increasing returns in the production of
each D-good. That is, a larger number of D-firms can cluster at a location, only if the
location can offer a sufficiently large demand for their products as well as a sufficiently
large labor pool. In other words, producers of D-goods tend to cluster at the location
where a large number of consumers (who are workers as well) concentrate.
These two sources of the agglomeration force generate a circular causation of agglomer-
ation economies: a concentration of a larger number of D-firms at a given location implies
a larger number of available D-goods there. Due to love of variety, then, more consumers
are attracted to the location, which in turn provides a larger demand for D-goods as well
as a larger pool of workers. As a result, an even larger number of specialized D-firms
can be supported at that location. Agglomeration of more D-firms leads to a further
expansion of the product variety available at that location.
3.2 Dispersion force
The dispersion force which works against the agglomeration force can be generated by
introducing spatially dispersed immobile resources in some forms. Figure 3.1 identifies
prototype models in terms of the way such immobile resources are incorporated. As the
figure indicates, one way is to assume that a fixed fraction of the total population is dis-
persed over space and immobile engaging in the production of H-goods. In the two-region
model by Krugman [27], H-goods represent agricultural goods produced by immobile
farmers who are evenly distributed between the regions. Another way is to explicitly
consider the land use for the purpose of production and/or consumption. In Fujita and
Krugman [10], H-goods represent agricultural goods which are produced subject to the
Leontief technology using mobile labor and immobile land uniformly distributed over a
continuous location space. In the two-region model by Helpman [19], on the other hand
H-goods represent the land for housing which is immobile and distributed between the
regions.4 In these ways, the prototype models incorporates either H-goods themselves or
inputs for their production as immobile resources.
4In Krugman and Livas Elizondo [33] which investigates the impacts of international trade on the
industrial localization pattern in the domestic economy, the model which is qualitatively the same as
Helpman’s is used to describe the spatial structure of the domestic economy. The difference is that in
order to generate a dispersion force, the Krugman-Livas Elizondo’s model assume a commuting cost and
consumption of a fixed amount of land by each worker in each location in the two-point location space
rather than assuming zero commuting cost with a fixed amount of land available at each location as in
the Helpman’s model. See also Krugman [32] for the discussion of the nature of dispersion force which
arises in the Krugman-Livas Elizondo model.
5
Source of dispersion forcesSource of agglo-meration forces Prototype models
scale economies
in D-production/
product variety
of D-goods
immobile
resource
land
H-workers
H-production
H-consumption
Krugman [27]
Helpman [19]
Krugman [10]
Figure 3.1. Prototypes of spatial monopolistic competition model with consumption
good variety.
There are two types of dispersion forces, local demand pull and factor price pull, which
may arise from these immobile resources. In the below, we explain how these dispersion
forces work.
local demand pull
The local demand pull is generated when there exists a spatially dispersed demand
for D-goods. Namely, because of spatially dispersed consumers, a firm producing D-
good may find it more profitable to move away from competitors and serve the local
demand at a remote location where the intensity of competition is lower. Among the
prototype models, the Krugman’s and Fujita-Krugman models include this dispersion
force. Namely, in the Krugman’s model, farmers producing H-goods are assumed to be
distributed over the space, i.e., consumers are a priori assumed to be spatially dispersed.
In the Fujita-Krugman model, while all workers are freely mobile, those who are employed
in the land-intensive H-good sector (H-sector) are inevitably dispersed, and generate a
spatially dispersed demand for D-goods.
factor price pull
The factor price pull may work as a dispersion force when the transportation of H-
goods is costly. Namely, if the transport cost for H-goods is relatively high, freely mobile
workers prefer to reside closer to their production site. Consequently, the wage rate tends
to decrease at locations where the production of H-goods takes place. Hence, D-firms (who
use labor as a sole input) may find it more profitable to locate closer to the production
site of H-goods enjoying the lower labor cost there, than to agglomerate near competitors.
Among the prototype models, the Fujita-Krugman model incorporates this dispersion
force by assuming a positive transport cost for agricultural goods, while the Helpman’s
model generates it by considering (untransportable) land for housing.5 The Krugman’s
5It is to be noted that the Helpman’s model does not assume a priori spatially distributed demand.
In his two region model, all consumers are freely mobile. But, they consume land for housing which is
scarce, distributed between regions and immobile.
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model, on the other hand, excludes it by assuming a zero transport cost for agricultural
goods.
Now, let us illustrate how the local demand pull and factor price pull works as dis-
persion forces by using the model by Fujita and Krugman which contains both types of
dispersion forces.
The location space, X, in their case is represented by a continuous one-dimensional
space, [−∞,∞], over which land is uniformly distributed. The homogeneous work force
of a given size N is endogenously allocated to the production of H-goods and D-goods.
Now, let us assume a priori that all D-firms are concentrated at location x = 0, and call
this concentration of D-firms a city. By using usual market conditions and by assuring
the equal utility level of all workers, we can determine all unknowns associated with this
monopolar configuration of the economy. In particular, the agricultural fringe distance,
l ∈ (0,∞), is determined, so that the agricultural hinterland extends over interval [−l, l],
over which the price of the agricultural good at each location, y, is given by pH(y) =
exp (−τH |y|), where pH(0) is normalized to be 1 and τH represents the transport rate for
H-goods. Since each unit of H-good is assumed to be produced by 1 unit of land and a
units of labor, the land rent at each location is given by R(y) = max {pH(y)− aW (y), 0},
where the equilibrium wage rate at each y can be obtained as
W (y) = (1/a)e−µ(τD+τH)l+{µτD−(1−µ)τH}|y|. (3-1)
Landlords are assumed to be attached to each location, and spend the entire revenue from
the land rent on consumption of D- and H-goods at that location.
Let us now derive the so-called (market) potential function which measures the prof-
itability of D-firms at each location relative to that of the city. Suppose a D-firm moves
away from competitors at x = 0, and locates at any x ∈ X. Let D(x) represent the total
potential demand for the product of this firm from the entire economy (under the mill
price given by (2-4)), and let π(x) represent the potential profit of the firm at location x.
Then, it can be shown that π (x) R 0⇔ D(x) R q, where q is the (zero-profit) equilibrium
output of each firm given by (2-5). The potential function, Ω(x), is then defined as
Ω(x) ≡ D(x)/q. (3-2)
Note that π (x) R 0 ⇔ Ω(x) R 1. Since D-firms can earn zero profit in the city, they
have no incentive to move away from the city if Ω(x) < 1 for all x (6= 0) ∈ X, while they
are better off by deviating to a location x (6= 0) if Ω(x) > 1. A more precise form of the
potential function for the monopolar configuration can be given as follows:
Ω(x) = (1/q)W (x)−σ
½
µW (0)ND
npD(0)1−σ
e(1−σ)τD|x| +
R l
−l
µpH(y)e
(1−σ)τD|x−y|
npD(0)1−σe(1−σ)τD|y|
dy
¾
, (3-3)
which is symmetric with respect to the city, i.e., x = 0. Each term in (3-3) can be
interpreted as follows: W (x)−σ represents the labor cost advantage of the location x;
µW (0)ND [resp., µpH(y)] the market size (for D-goods) at the city [resp., at location y in
the agricultural area]; exp ([1− σ] τD |x|) [resp., exp ([1− σ] τD |x− y|)] the accessibility
to the market in the city [resp., at y] from the production location x; npD(0)1−σ [resp.,
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npD(0)
1−σe[1−σ]τD|y|] the intensity of competition in the D-goods market at the city [resp.,
at y].
In the potential function, we can readily see how the local demand pull attracts D-
firms to the agricultural area. While the market size in the city may be larger than that
at a remote location in the agricultural area, the intensity of competition is higher in the
city. Thus, if the intensity of competition in the agricultural area is sufficiently low, it may
be profitable for D-firms to locate in the agricultural area, and serve this local market.
Note that the existence of local demand (by farmers and landlords) in the agricultural
area is essential for the deviating firm to reap the benefit of low intensity of competition
there.
The way the factor price pull works is reflected in the term expressing the labor
cost advantage, W (x)−σ. By (3-1), if τD < τH(1 − µ)/µ, then dW (x)/dx < 0, i.e.,
d (W (x)−σ) /dx > 0, and hence the labor cost advantage increases as a D-firm moves
away from the city. Namely, if the transport cost for D-goods is relatively low, given
the same wage rate over space, the utility level tends to be higher in the agricultural
area where H-goods are cheaper. It follows that the wage rate tends to be lower in the
agricultural area, and hence this labor cost advantage attracts D-firms from the city.
The balance between the agglomeration and dispersion force in the vicinity of the city
can be seen by computing the slope of the potential curve at the city:
Ω0 (0+) ≡ lim
x→0
∂Ω(x)/∂x = −σ {(2− 1/σ)µτD − (1− µ) τH} . (3-4)
Thus, we have
Ω0 (0+) R 0⇔ τD Q (1/µ− 1) / (2− 1/σ) τH . (3-5)
It follows that in order for the concentration of D-firms at x = 0 to be sustained, the
relative transport cost for D-goods needs to be sufficiently high so that Ω0 (0+) < 0. In
other words, the labor cost advantage in the agricultural area must be sufficiently small.
It is to be noted, however, the dispersion of D-firms do not necessarily take place in the
vicinity of the city, but it may take place at a remote location in the agricultural area
where the intensity of competition is sufficiently low (recall that the competition intensity
becomes lower as a D-firm moves away from the city). In fact, it can be shown that the
shape of the potential curve over the interval, [0, l], is first convex and the rest is concave
to the below.6
4 Stability and adjustment of the spatial system
In this section, we introduce an adjustment mechanism of population distribution which
governs the stability and transformation of the economy’s spatial structure. In any of the
prototype models and their extensions, the following adjustment mechanism or qualita-
tively the same variants are adopted. Namely, given a set of transport rates, (τD, τH),
6Since the potential curve for the monopolar system is symmetric with respect to the city location,
x = 0, and since the curve beyond the agricultural fringe distance, l, has no importance for our purpose,
we can focus on the behavior of the curve over the interval, [0, l].
8
suppose that each location i in a set J ≡ {1, 2, · · · , J} of discrete locations are populated
with workers employed by D-firms (D-workers) of population size, Ni, in a location space
consist of a set K ≡ {1, 2, · · · , K} of discrete locations whereK ≥ J . Then the population
distribution is driven by the following adjustment mechanism:
N˙i = φNi (ui − u¯)N for i ∈ K, (4-1)
where u¯ ≡
P
j∈K ujNj/N is the average utility level of mobile workers given the population
distribution, and φ is a positive constant.7
A population distribution, {Ni | i ∈ K}, is in equilibrium if N˙i = 0 for all i ∈ K. The
equilibrium is said to be stable if any arbitrarily small perturbation given to the equilib-
rium population distribution eventually dies out following the adjustment process (4-1),
otherwise it is said to be unstable, and the adjustment mechanism leads the population
distribution to another adjacent stable equilibrium.
In the case of a continuous location space of the Fujita-Krugman model, the set of
location indices needs to be modified in such a way that K = J + {J + 1}, where the
(J +1)th location corresponds to any location in the agricultural area, i.e., all H-workers
in the agricultural area are assumed to have the same utility level at each moment of time.
That is, (4-1) also controls division of labor between differentiated good sector (D-sector)
and H-sector.
Also, in order to accommodate the potential formation of new cities, the definition
of the stability of an equilibrium in this case should be modified in the following way.
Namely, a perturbation to an equilibrium needs to include the creation of finitely many
and arbitrarily small cities at arbitrary points on the location space. Then, the equilibrium
is said to be stable if this perturbation dies out under the adjustment process (4-1) defined
for this extended set of cities and the agricultural area, otherwise it is said to be unstable.
In the context of the Fujita-Krugman model, it has been shown that no new city is
viable at any location x such that Ω(x) < 1. It follows that a monopolar equilibrium is
stable if the potential value is less than 1 everywhere except at the city (Fujita and Mori
[14] Lemma 5.1).
5 Impacts of a decrease in transport costs for differ-
entiated goods
In this section, we present the impacts of changes in transport cost for D-goods on the
spatial distribution of agglomerations (of D-firms and workers). Since the existing studies
by Krugman [27][29], Helpman [19], Mori [38], and Tabuchi [46] have already provided
enough results, our task here is to unify the implications from their findings. Figure
5.1 summarizes the correspondence between the three prototype models, two types of
dispersion forces,8 and impacts of changes in the transport cost for D-goods on the spatial
distribution of D-firms.
7The adjustment of the population distribution is not affected by the utility level of immobile workers
such as farmers in the Krugman’s model, or that of immobile landlords of the Fujita-Krugman’s model.
8More precisely, we mean by dispersion force the force that triggers the dispersion of D-sectors from
their full agglomeration (i.e., core-periphery structure).
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One extreme result is shown by Krugman [27] which embodies only the local demand
pull as a dispersion force by assuming spatially dispersed immobile farmers with zero
transport cost for their products, H-goods. In this context, it has been shown that there
is a monotonic relation between the transport cost for D-goods and the spatial distribution
of D-firms. Namely, in the two-region economy in which farmers are distributed evenly
between the regions, D-firms agglomerate in one region given a transport cost for D-goods
below some critical value, while they disperse over both regions evenly given a transport
cost for D-goods above the critical value.
Krugman [29] has refined this result by extending his original two-region model to the
many-(discrete)-region model. Namely, he has shown that D-firms agglomerate [resp.,
disperse] into a smaller [resp., larger] number of locations under a lower [resp., higher]
transport cost for D-goods. In particular, the distance between each pair of agglomerations
of D-firms is roughly the same. Here, a change in the magnitude of transport cost induces
a change in the intensity of competition over space, which in turn influences the location
of D-firms. Namely, given a lower transport cost for D-goods, the intensity of competition
becomes more similar over space, and hence there is a smaller incentive for D-firms to
relocate. Given a higher transport cost for D-goods, on the contrary, the intensity of
competition decreases more rapidly as an D-firm moves away from competitors, and hence
they tend to be attracted to a location with less number of competitors, i.e., they tend
to disperse over space in order to enjoy the low intensity of competition. Consequently,
for a lower transport cost for D-goods, the agglomeration force tends to dominate the
dispersion force, and D-firms agglomerate at a larger scale into a smaller number of
locations serving an extensive hinterland, while for a higher transport cost for D-goods,
they tend to agglomerate at a smaller scale into a larger number of locations dispersed
over space serving a smaller hinterland.
prototype models local demand pull factor price pull transport cost for D-goodslower higher
agglomeration dispersion
dispersion agglomeration dispersion
dispersion agglomeration
Krugman [27]
Fujita and Krugman [10]
Helpman [19]
yes
yes yes
yesno
no
Figure 5.1. Types of dispersion forces and the impact of changes in transport cost for
D-goods on the spatial structure of the economy.
The other extreme result (opposite to Krugman’s above) is obtained by Helpman
[19]. In his model, an H-good represents land for housing. In a two-region economy, the
dispersion force is not generated from the local demand pull as in the Krugman’s model,
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but it is generated by the factor price pull due to the difference in rent for untransportable
land allocated (and immobile) in each region. In this context, Helpman has found the
monotonic relation between the magnitude of transport costs for D-goods and the spatial
distribution of D-firms, which is opposite to the result obtained by Krugman. Namely,
there is a critical value of transport cost for D-goods below which D-firms disperse over
the two regions, and above which they agglomerate into one region. The underlying
mechanism for this result can be understood as follows. When the transport cost for D-
goods is lower, given freely mobile workers, the wage rate at each location tends to reflect
the local land rent. Since the land rent is lower with a lower density of D-firms per unit
of land, then, D-firms disperse over the two regions exploiting the labor cost advantage.
On the other hand, given a higher transport cost, the wage rate in each region tends to
reflect the local price of D-goods, and hence the region with more D-firms gets the labor
cost advantage, and the agglomeration force is reinforced there.
Tabuchi [46] has combined the above two prototype models of Krugman’s and Help-
man’s, and hence incorporated the two types of dispersion force in one model.9 He has
shown that in this case the relation between the magnitude of the transport cost for D-
goods and the spatial distribution of D-firms becomes non-monotonic unlike the above
two models. Namely, D-firms disperse over the two regions for a transport cost for D-
goods which is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low, while they agglomerate into one
region when the transport cost for D-goods takes an intermediate value. The mechanism
causing such phenomena can be understood by combining the mechanisms generating the
results in the Krugman’s and Helpman’s models.
Namely, when the transport cost for D-goods is low, since the local demand pull is
not an effective dispersion force, since the intensity of competition is similar over space,
the factor price pull incurred by the lower land rent in a less inhabited location tends
to dominate. Thus, as in the Helpman’s case, D-firms tend to disperse between the two
regions seeking for a cheaper land rent. When the transport cost for D-goods is high,
on the contrary, the high intensity of competition near competitors tends to disperse
D-firms. Notice that since the wage rate tends to be lower in the region where D-firms
concentrate, the factor price advantage encourages a further agglomeration. That is, the
local demand pull is the only effective dispersion force as in the Krugman’s model, and
the demand from the immobile farmers eventually attract D-firms to disperse over space.
For an intermediate transport cost, all D-firms agglomerate in one region, since neither
dispersion force is strong enough to dominate the agglomeration force.
Not surprisingly, similar results can be obtained by using another prototype model by
Fujita and Krugman which embodies the local demand pull by assuming a labor input
in the land-intensive production of H-goods, and the factor price pull by introducing a
positive transport cost for H-goods. However, the setting of this model is more general (in
terms of interregional spatial structure) than other models in that a continuous location
9Tabuchi introduced the factor price pull in a way different from that of Helpman’s. Namely, he
introduced commuting costs while assuming the existence of infinite amount of land in each location.
This formulation generates essentially the same dispersion force which is incorporated in the Helpman’s
model.
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space is assumed, and that all workers are homogeneous and the division of labor be-
tween D- and H-sectors is endogenously determined. Consequently, more general results
regarding the spatial distribution of agglomerations can be derived from this model.
First, it is to be noted that in the context of the Fujita-Krugman model, while the
dispersion of D-firms always takes place given a sufficiently low transport cost for D-goods
as in the case of Helpman’s and Tabuchi’s models, a higher transport cost for D-goods does
not always disperse D-firms unlike the case of the models by Krugman and Tabuchi. The
former result is obvious from (3-5), i.e., Ω0 (0+) > 0 for τD < (1/µ− 1) / (2− 1/σ) τH . For
the latter result, it can be shown that if the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently
high, i.e., if σ is sufficiently small so that σ < 1/ (1− µ), then the monopolar equilibrium
is stable for all τD larger than (1/µ− 1) / (2− 1/σ) τH (at which Ω0 (0+) = 0) (Fujita
and Mori [14, Lemma 4.1(2)]). Thus, in this case, starting from a monopolar equilibrium,
any increase in the transport cost for D-goods never disperses D-firms. In the Fujita-
Krugman model, unlike Krugman’s and Tabuchi’s model, all workers are homogeneous
and freely mobile, and the division of labor between D- and H-sectors is endogenous.
That is, consumers can indefinitely substitute H-goods for highly differentiated D-goods
by agglomerating to the city and producing more D-goods.
When the degree of product differentiation is not too high, i.e., σ is sufficiently large
(i.e., σ > 1/ (1− µ)), an increase in transport cost for D-goods will eventually disperse
D-firms as in the case of the Krugman’s and Tabuchi’s models. To see how the balance
between agglomeration force and two types of dispersion forces changes in this case given
different transport costs for D-goods, let us show in Figure 5.2 illustrative examples of
potential curves (for x ≥ 0) for a monopolar system under various values of transport
rate, τD, for D-goods, while fixing the transport rate for H-goods at τH = 0.8, where
other parameter values are set as follows:
N = 3;µ = 0.5;σ = 5;α = β = 1; a = 0.5 (5-1)
Thus, we have σ = 5 > 1/ (1− µ) = 2. In the figure, we can see that at τD = 1, Ω(x) < 1
for all x 6= 0, i.e., no D-firm has an incentive to move out the city at x = 0.10
As τD increases, however, while Ω0 (0+) decreases (i.e., the kink of the potential curve
at the city becomes sharper), the potential value at a remote location in the agricultural
area becomes larger. Notice that since the intensity of competition is very high in the
small vicinity of the city, it is not profitable for a D-firm to move away from the city
(giving up the proximity to the large market there). However, since the transport cost
for D-goods is high, the intensity of competition becomes rapidly lower as a D-firm moves
away from the city, which means that the market potential rapidly increases once the
D-firm departs from the small vicinity of the city. In other words, ceteris paribus the
urban shadow of the city is smaller when the transport cost for D-goods is higher. As
indicated in the figure, the potential value reaches 1 at x = 0.485 at τD = 4.145 and it
exceeds 1 over an interval given a larger value of τD as in the case of τD = 5.0. Thus for
10lt can be shown that if τD > (1/µ− 1) (2− 1/σ) τH , the monopolar system is a stable equilibrium
for a sufficiently small population size, N , if σ > 1/ (1− µ), and it is a stable equilibnum for any N > 0
if σ < 1/ (1− µ) (Fujita and Mori [14, Lemma 4.1]).
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τD > 4.145, D-firms will no longer continue agglomerating at x = 0, but move towards
locations in the agricultural area offering a positive profit.
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Figure 5.2. Potential curves for various transport rates for D-goods.
Next, as τD decreases, the slope of the potential curve at the city, Ω0 (0+), increases,
and eventually reaches 1 at τD = (1/µ− 1) (2− 1/σ) τH . Thus, the monopolar sys-
tem cannot be held given a further decrease in τD. Moreover, it can be shown that
limx↓0 d
2Ω(x)/dx2 > 0 at τD = (1/µ− 1) (2− 1/σ) τH if the degree of product differen-
tiation is sufficiently low, i.e., σ is sufficiently large. Our example shown in the figure
corresponds to this case. Namely, when transport rate τD for D-goods decreases to 0.524,
the potential value reaches 1 at x = 0.843, and it exceeds 1 over an interval given a
smaller value of τD as in the case of τD = 0.45. Thus, D-firms will no longer continue
agglomerating in the city at x = 0, but move towards a remote location in the agricultural
area avoiding the high intensity of competition near competitors.
Mori [38] has demonstrated, in the context of a continuous location space assumed in
the Fujita-Krugman model, that the dispersion of D-firms caused by the local demand pull
and that caused by the factor price pull are qualitatively different. In the former case,
as in the case of Krugman [29], the agglomeration of D-firms takes place at a smaller
scale but at a larger number of discrete locations, and each small mass of D-firms serves
primarily its nearby area. In our example, at τD = 4.145, an arbitrarily small perturbation
to the equilibrium population distribution triggers a bifurcation of the spatial system via
the adjustment mechanism (4-1), and results in the formation of one or two new discrete
masses of D-firms, i.e., new cities, at either or both of locations x = ±0.485. Figure 5.3(a)
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and (b) depict respectively the potential curve and wage curve when a new city emerges
only at x = 0.485 after the bifurcation.11 In diagram (a), while sharp kinks of the potential
curve at the two cities at x = 0 and 0.485 indicate that the strong agglomeration force
is at work near the cities, the potential value starts increasing rapidly in the agricultural
area a little away from the cities (around x = ±0.6) due to the rapidly decreasing intensity
of competition in the agricultural area. Thus, the shape of the potential curve implies
that when the transport cost for D-goods is high, the hinterland of the city tends to be
smaller. As shown in diagram (b), due to the high transport cost for D-goods, the cities
have a labor cost advantage, and hence the effective dispersion force is only the local
demand pull.
In the latter case, i.e., when the dominating dispersion force is the factor price pull, the
dispersion takes place over an interval generating a so-called megalopolis which consists
of two (discrete) core cities connected by an industrial belt, i.e., a continuum of cities.
The megalopolis formation is triggered when the transport rate for D-goods decreased to
τD = 0.524. The potential curve which corresponds to τD = 0.524 indicates, however,
that location x = 0.843 (and −0.843) is the only possible location for D-firms except
the city. Namely, the interval (0, 0.843) is under the urban shadow of the existing city
due to the high intensity of competition. Thus, an arbitrarily small perturbation to the
population distribution at this moment can generate a new city or cities only at either
or both of locations, x = ±0.843, via the adjustment mechanism (4-1). However, the
transformation of the spatial system does not stop here. The reason for this is illustrated
by Figure 5.4(a-1) and (a-2) which depict respectively the potential curve and wage curve
of a bipolar economy with two discrete cities at x = 0 and 0.843. Diagram (a-1) indi-
cates that the potential value exceeds 1 along interval (0, 0.843), and hence D-firms are
attracted to the interval. We can interpret this situation as follows. Once the new city
emerged at x = 0.843, given a low transport cost for D-goods, locations along the interval
(0, 0.843) between the two cities become indifferent for D-firms and workers in terms of the
competition intensity and market proximity to both cities. However, given the relatively
high transport cost for H-goods, the interval can offer a relatively low price for H-goods.
It follows that since workers attain the same utility level, the wage rate along the interval
tends to be lower than that in the cities, which is in fact confirmed by diagram (a-2).
This labor cost advantage, i.e., the factor price pull then attracts D-firms to migrate into
the interval between the existing two cities.
Notice, however, that the labor cost advantage continues to exist as long as exclusively
agricultural area remains along the interval (0,0.843). Hence, the interval between the
oldest two cities at x = 0 and 0.843 eventually filled with D-firms and their workers
generating an industrial belt. In equilibrium, then, while H-goods continue to be produced
at each location along the industrial belt, there will be no transportation of H-goods along
it. The excess supply of H-goods produced outside the megalopolis is then transported
to and consumed in the cities at x = 0 and 0.843 (see Appendix for the conditions for
a megalopolis equilibrium). The D-worker distribution and wage curve of the resulting
megalopolis equilibrium are depicted in diagram (b-1) and (b-2) respectively. There is
a discrete mass of D-workers of size 0.532 at each of the two core cities at x = 0 and
11Three equilibria, i.e., two bipolar system with cities at x = 0 and 0.485 or −0.485, and one tripolar
system with cities at x = 0 and ±0.485, are all realizable as a result of the bifurcation at τD = 4.145.
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0.843 at the edge of the megalopolis, while D-workers are distributed along the industrial
belt connecting the two core cities with density ranging from 0.81 to 0.83. The D-worker
density is higher towards the center of the industrial belt, reflecting the slightly better
market proximity there. As we can see in diagram (b-2), the wage differential within the
megalopolis (i.e., in interval (0, 0.843)) is mitigated, since all excess factor price advantage
is exploited there.12
A further decrease in τD results in an expansion of the megalopolis. Diagram (c-1)
indicates that the potential value at x = 1.150 (and x = −0.307) in the agricultural area
reaches 1 at τD = 0.451. Diagram (c-2) implies that the lower labor cost in the agricultural
area is attracting D-firms. As a result, the megalopolis expands to either one of intervals
(−0.307, 0.843), (0, 1.150), or (−0.307, 1.150). It should be noted that since core cities
always locate at the edge of a megalopolis, the location of core cities changes as the
megalopolis expands. Diagram (d-1) and (d-2) present the resulting D-worker distribution
and wage curve when the megalopolis expanded to the interval (0, 1.150). In this case, the
core city at x = 0.843 disappeared and a new core city emerged at x = 1.150. Diagram
(d-1) indicates that the size of core cities decreased from 0.532 to 0.332, reflecting that the
agglomeration economies become less effective under the decreasing transport cost for D-
goods.13 Diagram (d-2) shows that the wage differential is mitigated within the expanded
megalopolis. In this way, a decrease in τD continues to expand the megalopolis, and
eventually covers entire agricultural area.
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Figure 5.3. Formation of multiple discrete cities under a high transport cost for D-goods.
12The filling-in process of new cities between old cities which takes place in the megalopolis formation
is in fact observed in the formation process of the megalopolis along the North-East cost of the US from
Boston to Washington D.C. via New York and Philadelphia during the 19th century (Gottmann [18,
Fig.51]). Also, the formation process of so-called edge cities emerging around the old metropolitan area
of the US cities resembles the megalopolis formation, while the mechanism generating edge cities may
differ from that makes a megalopolis in the context of our model. [See Garreau [17] and Urban Land
Institute [48] for detailed descriptions of edge cities.]
13Note that a positive transport cost for D-goods is essential for generating agglomeration economies
in the models we deal with.
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Figure 5.4. Megalopolitanization under the decreasing transport cost for D-goods.
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So far, by reviewing and extending the results obtained by existing studies, we sum-
marized the impact of changes in the transport cost for D-goods on the location pattern
of D-industry. It has been shown that depending on the type of dispersion force, the
impact of transport cost changes turned out to be quite different. Namely, if the local
demand pull is the only dispersion force, then given that the degree of product differenti-
ation is not too high, a higher [resp., lower] transport cost for D-goods tends to disperse
D-firms in such a way that they concentrate at a smaller [resp., larger] scale at a larger
[resp., smaller] number of discrete locations, and each mass of D-firms serves a smaller
[resp., larger] hinterland around it. On the other hand, if the factor price pull is the only
dispersion force present in the economy, D-firms tend to agglomerate [resp., disperse] into
a smaller [resp., larger] number of locations given a higher [resp., lower] transport cost
for D-goods. When both of the dispersion forces are involved, the effect of transport
cost change is not monotonic as in the cases with either one of dispersion force. Namely,
D-firms tend to disperse when the transport cost is either sufficiently high or low, while
they tend to concentrate into a smaller number of locations for an intermediate transport
cost. Moreover, in the context of a continuous location space, it has been shown that
depending the dominating dispersion force, the patterns of spatial dispersion of D-firms
are qualitatively different. Namely, if the transport cost for D-goods is high, i.e., the
local demand pull is the dominating dispersion force, then D-firms tend to disperse into a
larger number of discrete locations. On the other hand, if the transport cost for D-goods
is low, the factor price pull becomes the dominating dispersion force, then D-firms tend
to disperse over an interval leading to the formation of a megalopolis.
6 Impacts of a transport cost decrease: megalopoli-
tanization or polarization
Unlike the previous section, here, we consider decreases in transport costs for both D-
and H-goods, and demonstrate that depending on the relative rate of their decrease, the
resulting spatial structure of the economy differs drastically. For this purpose, we use
the framework of the Fujita-Krugman model, and examine the impact of transport cost
changes focusing on two illustrative situations. Namely, in subsection 6.1, we present how
an initially monopolar economy (i.e., D-firms are concentrated at one discrete point on the
continuous location space) transforms when transport costs decrease, and in subsection
6.2, we extend our analysis for the case in which the economy is initially bipolar (i.e.,
D-firms are concentrated at two discrete points).
6.1 Monopolar economy and transport cost decrease: possible
emergence of a megalopolis
Suppose a monopolar system is in equilibrium, where all D-firms are concentrated at
x = 0 (see footnote 10 for the condition of a monopolar equilibrium). Recall that this
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situation can be realized when (τD, τH) = (1.0, 0.8) under the set of parameter values
given by (5-1). The potential curve for the monopolar system under this set of parameter
values is shown in Figure 5.2. Since Ω(x) < 1 for all x 6= 0, this equilibrium is indeed
stable.
Figure 6.1 summarizes the result of our numerical simulation which experiments how
initially a monopolar system at (τD, τH) = (1.0, 0.8) transforms given gradually decreas-
ing transport rates, τD and τH . The figure indicates the transformation of the spatial
structure of the economy as (τD, τH) moves away from the right-top corner, i.e., (1.0, 0.8).
Here, we only focus on the case in which both transport rates monotonically decrease.
CurveOA, OB andOC represent the bifurcation points of the spatial system. Namely,
if (τD, τH) is in the right of OA, then the monopolar system is in equilibrium, while if
(τD, τH) crosses the curve from the right, then the monopolar system is no longer an equi-
librium, and a megalopolis emerges. In particular, the bifurcation point A corresponds to
the megalopolis formation at (τD, τH) = (0.524, 0.8) which was explained in the previous
section (Figure 5.4(a,b)). The process of the megalopolis formation is qualitatively the
same along curve OA. Curve OB represents the bifurcation curve at which the expan-
sion of the megalopolis takes place. The expansion which takes place along this curve is
qualitatively the same as that happens at point B, i.e., (τD, τH) = (0.451, 0.8), which has
been explained in the previous section (Figure 5.4(c,d)). Similarly curve OC represents
the bifurcation curve at which the next expansion of the megalopolis takes place. In this
way, if the transport rate, τD, for D-goods decreases relatively faster, then the dispersion
of D-industry proceeds in the form of megalopolitanization. Since the size of core cities
of the megalopolis becomes smaller as τD becomes smaller (because the agglomeration
economies become less relevant), the expansion of the megalopolis becomes smoother and
finally continuous.14 It is to be noted, however, for τH ≤ 0.28, the formation and ex-
pansion of megalopolis is always continuous, since τD reaches (1/µ− 1) (2− 1/σ) τH , i.e.,
Ω0(0+) becomes 0, before the potential value at any location x 6= 0 in the agricultural
area reaches 1.
14Recall that in the previous section the size of core cities decreased from 0.532 to 0.332 as the mega-
lopolis expands when τD decreased from 0.524 to 0.451, which implies the reduction in the agglomeration
force at core cities.
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Figure 6.1. Impact of transport cost decrease on a monopolar economy: possible
emergence of a megalopolis.
Next, let us consider the case in which the transport cost for H-goods decreases faster.
Since τH decreases faster than τD, the wage rate in the agricultural area increases rel-
atively to that in the city (refer to (3-1)), which in turn implies that the city tends to
have a labor cost advantage over the agricultural area. In fact, we can see in (3-4) that
Ω0(0+) decreases as τH becomes relatively smaller, i.e., at least the market potential in
the city relative to its nearby agricultural area increases. However, given a decrease in the
relative transport cost for H-goods, the relative H-good price increases in the agricultural
area. Then due to the income effect, the demand for D-goods at each location in the
agricultural area tends to increase, and hence the local demand pull becomes stronger in
the agricultural area. Thus, these two opposing effects leaves the resulting change in the
market potential in the agricultural area ambiguous.
Our simulation indicates that if (τD, τH) does not reach OA, then no D-firms disperse
from the city at x = 0, and hence the monopolar system is sustained. Namely, when the
transport cost for H-goods decreases relatively faster, even though the transport cost for
D-goods becomes relatively high, i.e., the local demand pull becomes relatively stronger,
no dispersion of D-firms takes place unlike the case in which the transport cost for D-goods
increases (Figure 5.2). A part of the reason for this result can be seen by examining the
potential curve, (3-3), for a monopolar system. Namely, for τD > (1/µ− 1) (2− 1/σ) τH
(so that Ω0(0+) < 0), the monopolar system is a stable equilibrium, i.e., Ω0(x) < 1 for
all x 6= 0, if the population size, N , is sufficiently small (footnote 10). Since a small
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population size implies a small demand for H-goods, which in turn implies that a small
agricultural area is required. However, the local demand pull can be effective only if
the agricultural area is sufficiently large so that the intensity of competition sufficiently
decreases within the agricultural area. It follows that the dispersion of D-firms cannot
happen under a sufficiently small population size.
In summary, if the transport cost for D-goods decreases relatively faster, then eventu-
ally a megalopolis forms, and the megalopolis continues to expand if the transport cost
for D-goods continues to decrease faster. On the other hand, if the transport cost for the
H-good decreases relatively faster, then the agglomeration force remains to dominate the
dispersion force, and the monopolar system continues to be sustained.15
6.2 Multipolar economy and transport decrease: megalopoli-
tanization or polarization
If the transport cost for D-goods is relatively high so that τD > (1/µ− 1) (2− 1/σ) τH ,
and the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently small, i.e., σ > 1/ (1− µ), then
many-city system inevitably emerge as the population size of the economy becomes larger
(Fujita and Mori [14, Sec.5.3,5.6]).16 In the below, rather than attempting to explain all
the possible transformation processes of the spatial system involving multiple cities, we
focus on a simple example with two cities.
Suppose we have a monopolar equilibrium which is exactly the same as the initial
spatial system assumed in the previous section. It has been shown by Fujita and Mori
[14, Sec.5.3] that if the population size increases from N = 3 to 4.36, in order to meet the
increased local demand for D-goods in the expanded agricultural hinterland, a new city
or cities should emerge at either or both of locations, x = ±1.10, where the agricultural
area extends to l = 1.40. For simplicity, let us assume that a new city emerged only
at x = 1.10 when the population size reached N = 4.36. Thus, the monopolar system
transforms to a bipolar system with cities at x = 0 and 1.10. Let us call the city at x = 0
[resp., x = 1.10] city 1 [resp., city 2]. Not surprisingly, the two cities in a new equilibrium
have the same size, and the agricultural hinterland for these cities is divided at x = 0.55
(= 0.5 × 1.10), in the left [resp., right] of which all excess H-goods are transported to
city 1 [resp., city 2]. We take this bipolar system at N = 4.36 as the initial state of the
economy’s spatial structure, and investigate its transformation given a gradual decrease
in transport costs.
15In interpreting the figure, it should be noted that due to the hysteresis or irreversibility of agglomera-
tion processes, bifurcation curves, OA, OB, and OC, are valid only when (τD, τH) crosses them from the
right. If the transport cost for the H-good starts decreasing faster than that for D-goods after (τD, τH)
reached the left of OA, OB, and OC, then the megalopolis possibly contracts, or reduces to a system of
discrete cities.
16Recall that by (3-5), τD > (1/µ− 1) (2− 1/σ) τH ⇔ Ω0(0+) < 0, and this condition together with
σ > 1/ (1− µ) implies that Ω(x) < 1 for x 6= 0 for sufficiently small population size, N .
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Figure 6.2. Impact of transport cost decrease on a bipolar economy:
megalopolitanization or polarization.
Figure 6.2 summarizes the result. The initial situation is represented by the right-top
corner, i.e., (τD, τH) = (1.0, 0.8). First, suppose τD decreases relatively faster. Then,
on one hand, D-firms and consumers become rather indifferent among locations along
the interval between the two cities for their proximity to the market in these cities. On
the other hand, given a relatively high transport cost for the H-good, the wage rate at
each location tends to reflect the H-good price, i.e., the wage rate relatively decreases
in the agricultural area. Hence, the agricultural area along the interval between the two
cities attracts D-firms for its market proximity and labor cost advantage. When (τD, τH)
reaches bifurcation curve DE, D-firms start moving toward the interval, and the process
of the megalopolis formation sets in, following the same mechanism which generated a
megalopolis from a monopolar system in the previous subsection (Figure 5.4(a,b)).
Next, suppose τH decreases relatively faster. As mentioned in the previous subsection,
the impact on the balance between agglomeration force and dispersion force is ambigu-
ous in this case. The simulation result indicates, however, that when (τD, τH) reaches
bifurcation curve EF , one of the two cities collapse, and the bipolar system reduces to a
monopolar system.17 Once the spatial structure of the economy becomes monopolar, the
impact of a further decrease in transport costs is qualitatively the same as the one shown
by Figure 6.1. Hence, if τH continues to decrease faster, then the monopolar system
continues to be sustained.
17Which of the two cities at x = 0 and 1.10 survives is arbitrary, since this bipolar system is symmetric.
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In order to understand this polarization process, let us plot in Figure 6.3 the relative
utility level, U1/U2, of city 1 given each D-worker share, N1/(N1 + N2), of city 1 for
various value of τH , while fixing τD at 1.0, i.e., the change in the N1/(N1 +N2)-U1/U2-
curve along the (TD = 1.0)-locus in Figure 6.2. By investigating this curve, we can
find the equilibrium population distributions as well as their stability in terms of the
adjustment mechanism (4-1) when the location of cities are restricted at x = 0 and 1.10.
Namely, N1/(N1 +N2) with U1/U2 = 1 corresponds to an equilibrium D-worker share of
city 1, and the equilibrium is stable if the slope of the U1/U2-curve is negative.
At τH = 0.8 (i.e., at the right-top corner of Figure 6.2), as shown in diagram (a),
the symmetric bipolar system is the only stable equilibrium. When τH decreases to 0.52,
however, as shown in diagram (b), four more asymmetric bipolar equilibria emerge: the
two which are closer to the symmetric bipolar one are unstable, while the other two are
stable. The emergence of these asymmetric equilibria indicates that a relative decrease
in the transport cost for H-goods made the large concentration of D-firms at one of the
cities possible due to the increase in labor cost advantage near a large variety of D-goods.
At τH = 0.3, as shown in diagram (c), the two stable asymmetric equilibria are absorbed
into monopolar equilibria changing the stability of the monopolar equilibria. Thus, the
monopolar system is now a stable equilibrium, and a further decrease in relative transport
cost for H-goods magnifies the labor cost advantage generated by the concentration of
a larger variety of D-goods at one location (recall the wage curve for the monopolar
system (3-1) which increases towards the agricultural area when µτD > (1 − µ)τH). At
τH = 0.26, eventually, the symmetric bipolar equilibrium loses its stability, and only
monopolar equilibria remain to be stable.
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Figure 6.3. Transportation from a bipolar system to a monopolar system given a
decrease in transport cost for H-goods.
Thus, when the transport cost for H-goods decreases relatively faster, although the
increase in the relative H-good price in the agricultural area induces a larger demand
for D-goods there, generating a local demand pull towards the agricultural area, this
dispersion force tends to be dominated by the factor price pull towards the city generated
by the labor cost advantage which stems from the proximity to a large variety of D-goods
in the city. As a result, no dispersion of D-firms takes place when the transport cost for
H-goods decreases faster.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we presented the impact of a transport cost decrease on the spatial pat-
tern of economic agglomeration. In particular, by focusing on an economy in which the
agglomerative industry consists of firms producing differentiated consumption goods, we
have shown that locational differences in the market proximity, intensity of competition,
and factor price play an important role in determining the agglomeration patterns. Our
analysis, however, dealt with a rather limited situation. Thus, in applying our results to
understand the organization of the economic geography in the real world the following
remarks have to be kept in mind.
23
Remark 1. While our model involves only one type of differentiated consumption goods
in terms of the degree of product differentiation (represented by σ) and transport cost
(represented by τD), we observe several different varieties coexist in reality. For instance,
varieties of restaurants, operas and musicals, boutiques, and movie theaters are all differ-
ent from one another in both of the degree of product differentiation and transport cost.
As a result, strengths of agglomeration economies which arise in these different industries
are not the same. In particular, the industry which produces more highly differentiated
products is subject to stronger agglomeration economies, and hence it is more likely to be
polarized at a smaller number of locations. Thus, when multiple types of differentiated
goods are introduced, the megalopolitanization and polarization induced by transport cost
changes may be industry specific. [See Fujita, Krugman and Mori [11] for a preliminary
attempt to investigate the spatial organization of the economy when multiple types of
differentiated consumption goods are involved.]
Remark 2. While we generated the agglomeration force from product varieties of consump-
tion goods, there are a number of other important sources of agglomeration economies.
Examples are product varieties of intermediate goods (e.g., Fujita and Hamaguchi [9],
Krugman and Venables [34], Venables [49]); search and matching in local labor mar-
ket (Helsley and Strange [20]); information spillover through face-to-face communications
within an industry (see Fujita and Smith [15] for a survey); improvement in localized labor
productivity through learning-by-doing (e.g., Soubeyran and Thisse [45]).18 The agglomer-
ation economies which emerge from these different sources are affected differently by the
improvement of transportation and communication technologies, which in turn implies
that the impacts of transport development on the spatial organization of an economy
are also different depending on which type of agglomeration economies is relevant for the
economy in question.19
Remark 3. The two dispersion forces we considered in this paper are both market medi-
ated forces such as the demand pull from spatially dispersed consumers, transport costs
for land-intensive goods, land rent and commuting costs. However, non-market forces
such as congestion and pollution are also important. There are some attempts to incor-
porate congestion in the context of the monopolistic competition model with varieties of
consumption goods. In a two-point location space, Alonso-Villar [1] incorporates the traf-
fic congestion by assuming that the cost of shipping in and out of a location increases as
the population at the location increases. Brakman et. al [2] assume, in a discrete location
space, that the productivity of labor decreases as a location becomes more crowded. Ko-
fuji [25] assumes, in a two-point location space, that each variety of differentiated goods is
produced by using labor and social overhead capital, where the latter input is distributed
between the two locations and subject to congestion. Each study indicates that when the
congestion is the effective dispersion force, the impact of a decrease in transport costs for
differentiated goods is similar to the case in which the factor price pull is the effective
dispersion force in our model. Namely, firms tend to disperse given a lower transport
18See Duranton and Puga [5] for a recent survey of micro foundations of agglomeration economies.
19See Tofflemire [47] for the treatment of telecommunication technologies and their impact on the urban
structure.
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cost for differentiated goods. However, we conjecture that the dispersion due to factor
price pull and that due to congestion are qualitatively different. Namely, while the for-
mer has been shown to take the form of megalopolis formation, where two distinctively
large masses of industrial agglomerations are connected by an industrial belt, the latter
is likely to take the form of urban sprawl without generating any distinctive industrial
agglomeration point.
Remark 4. In reality, the transportation of goods is subject to transport density economies.
That is, the cost for shipping on a given link (or via a given hub) becomes smaller as
the transport density via the link/hub increases. A study by Mori and Nishikimi [39]
suggest that such agglomeration economies in transportation generates transport hubs
in a location space, which in turn attract firms and consumers through their hub effect,
and hence concentrations of industries and population tend to happen at transport hubs.
When the transport development is considered in this context, its impact on the spatial
organization of the economy may be quite different from the one we have obtained in this
paper.
Remark 5. While the transport cost change assumed in our model takes place uniformly
between any pair of locations, it is not likely to be so in reality. For instance improve-
ments in railway, highway, and airway networks proceeds first by connecting well estab-
lished economic centers. Such uneven development in transport networks may affect the
transformation of the economic geography in different ways from the ones we obtained in
this paper. [For discussions of related topics, see Fujita and Mori [13], Konishi [26], and
Krugman [31]].
Remark 6. While we ignored the impact of international trade on the spatial structure of
a domestic economy, Krugman and Livas Elizondo [33] has shown that the international
trade may have a large impact on the industrial localization pattern and spatial population
distribution within the domestic economy.
Remark 7. So far, no model is offered for the case in which industrial agglomeration
endogenously takes place within an otherwise residential area, and the consumers’ substi-
tution among proximity to their job location, that to the market for consumption goods,
and the size of land for housing is explicitly considered. However, especially in the devel-
oped countries, such a framework is more appropriate than that of the existing models
including ours.
Remark 8. While each firm in our model is a single entity, in reality, it may consist of
several units, each of which is subject to a different location behavior, and hence the
impact of transport cost changes on their location patterns may differ.20 [For a model
with multi-unit firms, see Ota and Fujita [40] and Duranton and Puga [6].]
20Ross [43], for instance, has shown that the ranking of cities in terms of their sizes and that in terms
of corporate control linkages are positively correlated in the case of the U.S. city system.
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Appendix: Condition for a megalopolis equilibrium
Here we consider an economy with a megalopolis. Let the locations of two symmetric
core cities be x = ±b (where b > 0), and denote the population size of these cities
by Nb. At each location between these cities, both D-goods and H-goods are produced
where the D-worker density is denoted by ND(y) for y ∈ (−b, b). Along this interval,
H-goods produced at each location are consumed at the same location, i.e., there is no
transportation of H-good. Thus, all the excess H-goods on (b, l] and that on [−l,−b) are
consumed in core cities at b and −b respectively, where ±l represents the agricultural
fringe distance. The H-good price for x ∈ (b, l] ∪ [−l,−b) is then given by pH(x) =
exp (−τH |b− |x||), where pH(b) and pH(−b) are normalized to be 1. By using (2-4) and
(2-6), the price index, TD(x), for the D-goods at location x can be obtained as follows:
TD(x) = (ασ)
1/(σ−1) β
1− 1/σ
×
nR b
−bND(s)W (s)
1−σe(1−σ)τD|x−s|ds+NbW (b)1−σ
¡
e(1−σ)τD|x−b| + e(1−σ)τD|x+b|
¢o1/(1−σ)
.(A-1)
The conditions that the land rent at the agricultural fringe is zero, i.e., R(±l) = 0, and
that all workers attain the same utility level assure that the wage rate at each location x
must equal to
W (x) = (1/a)pH(l)
µpH(x)
1−µ [TD(x)/TD(l)]
µ . (A-2)
In particular, W (b) = (1/a) exp (−µ [τH + τD] [l − b]). Next, since all the H-goods con-
sumed in the core city at b, (1− µ)NbW (b), is produced in the agricultural hinterland on
(b, l], and all the excess H-good on this interval, µ
R l
b
exp (−τH [x− b]) dx, is consumed
in the core city at b, then it must hold that (1 − µ)NbW (b) = µ
R l
b
exp (−τH [x− b]) dy.
Solving this equation for Nb, we obtain
Nb =
µ
1− µ
a
τH
©
eµ(τH+τD)(l−b) − e(µτD−[1−µ]τH)(l−b)
ª
, (A-3)
which is a function of only l. On the interval (−b, b), the demand for H-goods at each
location x, (1 − µ)ND(x)W (x)/pH(x), should be met by the supply of H-goods at the
same location x which in fact is a constant µ, and hence:
ND(x) =
µ
1− µ
pH(x)
W (x)
. (A-4)
Now, by using (2-1), (2-2), (2-4), (2-6) and (A-4), the total demand for the D-good
produced by the firm at location x, D(x), can be calculated as follows:
D(x) =
R l
−l Z(x, y)dy, (A-5)
where Z(x, y) is the demand at location y for the D-good produced at location x, and is
expressed by
Z(x, y) =
α
β
(σ − 1)µY (y)W (x)−σe(1−σ)τD|x−y|
Á
½
µ
1− µ
R b
−bW (s)
1−σpH(s)e
(1−σ)τD|s−y|ds+NbW (b)1−σ
¡
e(1−σ)τD|y+b| + e(1−σ)τD|y+b|
¢¾
.
(A-6)
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Then, by substituting (A-5) into (3-2), the clearing condition for the D-good market can
be obtained as
Ω(x) = 1 for x ∈ [−b, b] (A-7)
Finally, since the total number of D-workers is the total population less the number of
agricultural workers, i.e., N − 2al, then the demand and supply of labor meet if the
following equation is satisfied.
2
³
Nb +
R b
0
ND(x)dx
´
= N − 2al. (A-8)
Now, the real unknowns are the agricultural fringe distance, l, the H-good price, pH(x),
and the wage rate, W (x), for each x ∈ [0, b), which are determined by using (A-2), (A-7)
and (A-8). Finally, in order for the equilibrium to be stable, it must hold that Ω(x) < 1
for all x ∈ (b, l] ∪ [−l,−b).
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